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ABSTRACT 
The paper illustrates the desirability of an anti-foundationalist approach to normativity 
for the fullest realization of the liberal democratic project. The first section defends the 
viability, epistemic and normative, of an anti-foundationalism inspired to the anti-
metaphysical and anti-sceptical legacy of the founders of American pragmatism. The 
second section, drawing on the deliberative turn in democratic theory and the capability 
approach to autonomy, introduces what I regard to be the normative core of liberal 
democracy. The third section fleshes out the desirability argument by looking at how a 
pragmatist approach to normativity allows liberal democracies to address in a fully 
deliberative spirit the challenges posed by the growing cultural diversity of contemporary 
societies associated with contemporary processes of globalization.  
 
 
1. An epistemic and politically viable anti-foundationalism  
 
It is possible to see a viable pragmatist approach to normative validity 
emerging from the dialectical exchange between the two neo-pragmatist 
philosophers that have best expressed the anti-metaphysical and anti-
sceptical legacy of the founders of American pragmatism, namely Richard 
Rorty and Hilary Putnam (Trifirò 2008). This pragmatist conception of 
normativity is capable to maintain a place for normativity in a disenchanted 
world by offering an anti-foundationalist account of two key features of 
normative thoughts, i.e. its universalistic and transcendent aspirations, 
conveyed respectively by the expectation that there is only one truth for 
everyone at any place and time (Putnam 1981, 56; Rorty 1998, 2), and that it 
is always possible to make cautionary claims such as “we think p is true but it 
may not be true” (Putnam 1978; Rorty 1991, 128). The anti-foundationalist 
account of normativity that I attribute to Rorty and Putnam allows us to 
account for these dimensions of normativity by drawing three generally 
overlooked distinctions: 1) between a physical and a grammatical sense of the 
impossibility of foundationalism; 2) between a conception of universality as 
ground for as opposed to scope of our normative judgments; and 3) between a 
conception of transcendence as self-reflexivity as opposed to self-transcendence 
(Trifirò 2007). 
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The Wittgensteinian distinction between physical and grammatical 
impossibility enables us to appreciate that it is only those anti-
foundationalists that conceive of the impossibility of metaphysics as being of 
the physical order (as something due to some deficit in our cognitive settings 
that could in principle be overcome by some technological discovery for 
instance), and thus are still in the grasp of the view of normativity validity as 
adherence to reality as it is ‘in itself’, who will be forced to corrosive relativist 
conclusions of the anything-goes kind (see for instance Putnam 1990, 22; 
Rorty 1991, 202). Once we recognize that the epistemic assurance sought after 
by foundationalists is nowhere to be found because by definition it would be 
offered by a viewpoint from nowhere, we are able break free from the 
metaphysical framework altogether and clear the ground for an alternative 
conception of normativity that places the source of normative authority in 
that same contingent dimension of practice, laden with our set of values, 
needs and interests, that foundationalists attempt to transcend. On this 
pragmatist standpoint it is possible to appreciate that metaphysical 
neutrality does not need to entail normative neutrality; that normative 
validity and our critical faculties do not need to rest on universal 
transcendent ground. It is on the basis of this pragmatist ethnocentrism that 
Rorty and Putnam are capable of escaping the charge of self-stultifying 
relativism by accounting for the universalistic and transcendent aspirations of 
normativity without surrendering to the unintelligibility of metaphysical 
foundations. 
In particular, the distinction between justificatory ground for and scope of 
application of normative judgments allows us to realize that the fact that we 
cannot obtain universal ground for our views and practices does not mean that 
we cannot or should not hold them to be valid, and thus apply, universally. As 
Putnam (2003, 45) puts it, “recognizing that our judgments claim objective 
validity and recognizing that they are shaped by a particular culture are not 
incompatible”; for, as Rorty (1998, 2) points out, “granted that ‘true’ is an 
absolute term, its conditions of application will always be relative.” 
According to this pragmatist view, normative claims are indeed universal, but 
their universality is culturally grounded, not metaphysical. They are 
universal in scope not in ground. This distinction allows us to answer two 
criticisms traditionally associated to the charge of relativism, those of self-
contradiction and of violation of the law of non-contradiction. On the one 
side, a coherent anti-foundationalist will assert that anti-foundationalism is 
the correct epistemology (the universally valid one) only according to (on the 
ground of) its ethnocentric view of normativity, rather than self-
contradictorily on universal foundational grounds. On the other side, by 
keeping clear the distinction between ‘scope of’ and ‘ground for’ normativity 
as this is usually conveyed by the expressions ‘true for’ and ‘true according to’, 
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a coherent anti-foundationalist will avoid describing a normative conflict 
between points of view A and B through the contradictory statement that “p 
is at the same time (on the same ground) both true (for A) and false (for B),” 
employing instead the innocuous expression: “p is true for everyone according 
to A” and “p is false for everyone according to B”, therefore “p is universally 
true according to A and universally false according to B.” No contradiction is 
involved here, but only a conflict of standards of normative validity with 
universal aspirations. 
Similarly, the distinction between justification hic et nunc and justification 
sans phrase allows us to appreciate that the transcendent dimension of 
normativity does not require us “to step outside our skins and compare 
ourselves with something absolute” (Rorty 1982, xix), but only entails our 
capacity to “get beyond our present practices by a gesture in the direction of 
our possibly different future practices” (Rorty 1998, 61); that “reason is both 
immanent (not to be found outside of concrete language games and 
institution) and transcendent (a regulative idea that we use to criticize the 
conduct of all activities and institutions)” (Putnam 1983, 234). This means 
that anti-foundationalists can account for the fact that that we can always 
make cautionary claims of the sort “you think p is true, but it may not be true” 
without having to rely on the metaphysical distinction between ordo essendi 
and ordo conoscendi. According to pragmatists, we do indeed distinguish 
between ‘thinking that x is y’ and ‘x being y’, but this distinction can always 
only be made from within concrete practices of justification, current 
ethnocentric practices of right and wrong. As Putnam puts it, even though 
“traditions can be criticized”, “talk of what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in any area 
only makes sense against the background of an inherited tradition” (ibid.). The 
transcendence of normative validity amounts to the self-reflexive use of 
immanent reason.  
Such a pragmatist approach to universalism and transcendence of course 
invites the criticism of ethnocentrism, namely of unduly universalizing a 
contingent viewpoint and of failing to take in due account other points of 
view. This charge can take both an epistemic and normative slant. The 
epistemic version only reiterates the view of normativity shared by 
foundationalists and relativists alike according to which normative judgments 
and our critical faculties must stand on or refer to universal and transcendent 
grounds. This is the view which a viable anti-foundationalism discards by 
conceiving of universality as scope of application and transcendence as self-
reflexivity. The normative criticism accuses such a pragmatist approach of 
jeopardizing our liberal democratic societies by opening their gates to 
arrogant and vicious complacency, making anyone feeling justified in 
ignoring, if not oppress, other points of view. Such a criticism however fails to 
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grasp two key features of an epistemically viable anti-foundationalism, 
namely its epistemic and volitional nature. 
The ethnocentric character of normativity maintained by a viable anti-
foundationalism is exclusively of an epistemic kind, it is not normative. 
Epistemic ethnocentrism is a meta-normative view, a view of the justificatory 
grounds of our normative judgments, whatever these maybe, and as such it 
does not entail any substantive normative stance. It is a value-free 
epistemology, in the sense that it makes the endorsement of any substantive 
moral and political view dependent on our fundamental normative 
commitments, whatever these might be. This first-order normative neutrality, 
however, should not be confused with the second-order foundationalist view 
according to which normative validity itself is value-free because ‘from 
nowhere’. This point takes us to the second misunderstanding underlying the 
normative criticism of ethnocentrism. The proposed ethnocentric view of 
normativity is of a volitional kind, it is not cognitive. It considers our 
normative outlooks and projects as being unavoidably shaped by our 
contingent set of values, interests and needs, and consequently believes that 
no epistemological gate, not matter how strong, may ever secure our societies 
from the threat of vicious or anti-social behaviour. Only the strength of our 
collective moral and political sensitivity and commitment can safeguard the 
spirit of our liberal democratic societies. By drawing the distinctions between 
epistemic and normative ethnocentrism, and between volitional and cognitive 
approaches to normativity, it is thus possible to appreciate how an 
epistemically viable anti-foundationalism can also be regarded as a viable 
conception of normativity for liberal democratic politics. 
The above considerations do not purport to put forth a knock-down 
argument in favour of anti-foundationalism, they are only aimed to show that 
an anti-foundationalist conception of normativity can be epistemically and 
politically viable. It is however possible to formulate a pragmatist argument 
in favour of anti-foundationalism in terms of its desirability for the fullest 
realization of the liberal democratic project. Let us turn then to outline the 
view of the normative core of a genuine liberal democracy which will frame 
the desirability argument.  
 
 
2. The normative core of liberal democracy  
 
There has always been disagreement amongst supporters of the liberal 
democratic tradition on the defining characteristics of its political and moral 
project, on the interpretation and relative priority of its central values, as well 
as on the form of the practices and institutions that should implement them. 
Indeed, from a pragmatist standpoint we should expect any particular view of 
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the liberal democratic project to be the expression of a prior particular 
normative stance. The first step in elaborating what I take to be the 
normative core of the liberal democratic project should therefore be that of 
laying down the normative premises upon which my take on the liberal 
democratic tradition rests. These are the two normative premises that 
characterize the Kantian political tradition: the belief in the inherent dignity 
of every human being, and a conception of human dignity centred on the 
capacity of autonomously elaborating, choosing and pursuing different life 
projects. On this reading, the two fundamental values that a liberal 
democratic society should be committed to foster and protect are those of 
equality and autonomy. The normative substance of the former value depends 
on how autonomy, i.e. what needs equalizing, is conceptualized. The 
conception of autonomy that characterizes the reading of liberal democracy 
favoured in this paper is that emerging from the recent deliberative turn in 
democratic theory (Rawls 1971, 1993; Habermas 1984, 1990; Dryzeck 1990, 
2000; Benhabib 1996, 2002; Guttman & Thompson 1996, 2004, Young 1996) 
and the capability approach to freedom (Sen 1985, 1999; Nusbaum & Sen 
1993; Nussbaum 1999). According to this conception one can be regarded as 
an autonomous being when capable both to exercise one’s freedom of choice 
and action and participate in the collective decision-making processes that 
determine one’s material, social and institutional context of choice and 
action.  
These fundamental normative premises lead to three key tensions that 
have characterized the liberal democratic tradition throughout its historical 
developments. These tensions are involved in the never-ending task of 
striking the right balance and trade-offs between the opposite demands 
associated to the values of liberty and equality, liberal and democratic rights, 
and universalistic and particularistic aspirations. The first tension is entailed in 
the effort of tracing the limits that the value of social justice can legitimately 
pose to the exercise of individual freedom, and vice versa. The second tension 
is contained in the circular regression involved in the attempt to establish in a 
liberal and democratic way the constitutional limits that should safeguard 
individual autonomy from the ‘tyranny of the majority’. The third tension is 
expressed in the different conflicts that modulate the 
universalism/particularism opposition within liberal democracy, such as that 
between individual and collective rights (to what extent collective rights 
should constrain and be constrained by individual rights?), human rights and 
citizen rights (to what extent are the rights accorded to the members of an 
historical community to be extended to foreigners?), cosmopolitanism and 
popular sovereignty (to what extent liberal democratic principles and 
practices should be allowed to be re-interpreted so as to accommodate the 
needs, interests, and beliefs of particular historical communities?). 
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It is possible to grasp the normative core of a genuine liberal democratic 
society once we consider how, in order to address the above structural 
tensions in the full respect of everyone’s individual autonomy, liberal 
democrats should keep open to discussion and revision the particular 
constitutional, legislative and policy measures taken to solve them. This 
means that a genuine liberal democratic society should conceive of itself as a 
self-reflexive community committed to the never-ending project of devising the 
most appropriate institutions and principles for the respect of everyone’s 
autonomy through the all-inclusive and open-ended confrontation of all its 
members and everyone else that may be affected by its policies. The ‘open-
ended’ condition requires liberal democracies to refrain from considering their 
particular practices and institutions as definitive resolutions to the structural 
tensions between their driving values and other policies debates. (Cohen 1996; 
Benahbib 1996, 2004; Guttman & Thompson 1996, 2004; Mouffe 2000; 
Habermas 1996, 2004). The ‘all-inclusive’ condition requires them to bring 
back decision-making to the arena of public debate. The guiding principle is 
the familiar Habermasian one of making the validity of collective decisions 
conditional on practices of public deliberation that are, not only as open and 
un-distorted as possible, but inclusive of all the persons that could be affected 
by them (e.g. Habermas 1984; 1990; 1996).1 
Reflecting on the normative requirements set by this self-reflexive ethics 
of public discourse it is possible to appreciate how a pragmatist anti-
foundationalist approach is particularly suitable for the fuller realization of 
the liberal democratic project. On the one hand, such a meta-normative 
pragmatist approach, reminding us that any consensus reached is to be 
regarded as a temporary resting point prone to turn into oppressive status quo, 
enables us to remove the epistemic obstacles to the free questioning of 
received opinions and institutions and to a fair consideration of all points of 
view.2 On the other hand, it enables us to realize that the resolution of 
                                                 
1 Although endorsing an Habermasian normative view of liberal democracy, the anti-
foundationalist approach defended in this paper is in opposition with the Habermasian meta-
normative framework aimed at grounding the ‘opening’ and ‘inclusiveness’ principles via a 
pragmatic-transcendental deduction from the presupposition of communicative rationality. I 
develop a detailed criticism of Habermas’ foundationalist programme in Trifirò 2004. 
2 I acknowledge that foundationalists, and Habermas may be considered as an example here, may 
endorse self-reflexive and omni-inclusive practices of collective deliberation. Putting aside the 
question of the viability of foundationalism as a project, it is important to point out how such a 
foundationalis approach, by acknowledging that no practice or conviction should ever be regarded 
as immune from criticism and revision, would relax its first order claims of universal normative 
authority to such an extent as to erase any difference that would make a difference in practice 
between itself and an anti-foundationalist liberal position. Namely, even if foundationalism would 
be viable as an epistemic project, a foundationalist approach to deliberative liberal democracy 
would have to acknowledge the key point made by pragmatists, namely that foundationalism, and 
with it epistemological considerations, are irrelevant to our practice and to the resolution of 
concrete challenges facing liberal democracies, and therefore can be set aside with clear conscience. 
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normative conflicts does not make appeal to our alleged cognitive faculty to 
discover how things really are and should be, but rather to our moral 
sensitivity and political commitment, and especially our capacity to reflect 
collectively on the values that should guide our communities and on the 
means to meet them (Putnam 1987: 86; Rorty 1991: 110). It thus enables us 
to face our responsibility in the process of creation and support of a liberal 
democratic culture and to redirect our energies toward the only way in which 
we would ever be able to bring about social and political change: i.e. political 
will and concrete reformist commitment. 
The following section fleshes out this desirability argument by applying it 
to the challenge posed to liberal democracies by the intensification of cultural 
clashes associated with contemporary processes of global integration and 
fragmentation. In particular, it turns the pragmatist and deliberative light on 
current debates regarding cultural diversity with a view to showing how it is 
possible to rescue the politics of multiculturalism for liberal democracies from 
the normative and epistemological concerns and shortcomings of cultural 
relativists and liberal democratic universalists.  
 
 
3. A pragmatist and deliberative approach to multiculturalism 
 
Multiculturalism today is being discredited by two mutually opposite and 
reinforcing trends. On the one hand, by its association with the cultural 
relativist opposition to universal human rights perceived as a threat to 
cultural identity and sovereignty. On the other hand, by the resurgence of old 
and new forms of fundamentalism which perceive of cultural diversity as a 
threat to truth and morality. The former association has discredited 
multiculturalism to the liberal3 eye by defending, in the name of cultural 
autonomy, oppressive social practices which violate the individual autonomy 
of the most vulnerable of its members. The latter resurgence, when associated 
to liberal ethics and politics, has discredited the liberal democratic 
commitment to equality and freedom by denying recognition and autonomy 
to different cultural communities. We can see instances of these opposed and 
related trends in current policy and theoretical debates at both national and 
international level. The cultural relativist trend is exemplified by the use of 
‘cultural defence’ (Coleman 1996) strategies in criminal trials to mitigate 
sentences by appealing to the cultural background of the defendants, and, in 
the international sphere, by the ‘Asian values’ argument for legitimate 
cultural deviations from international human rights norms. The liberal 
fundamentalist trend is exemplified by the ban on the practice of veiling in 
                                                 
3 In the following, in order to avoid burdening the text with multiple adjectives, I will use ‘liberal’ 
as an elyptical expression for ‘liberal democratic’.  
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public spaces among Muslim women to foster their emancipation and reaffirm 
the laicity of the liberal democratic state, and by the international spread of 
the Washington Consensus model of liberal democracy based on free market 
and free periodic multi-party elections.  
The most recent case of cultural defence I have knowledge of is that of an 
Italian citizen who has been granted a reduced sentence from Buckeburg 
Tribunal, in Germany, for sequestering and raping his ex-girlfriend on the 
basis of his Sardinian origins. The motivation of the court reads as follow:  
The particular cultural and ethnic traits of the defendant must also be 
taken into account. He is Sardinian. The picture of the role of men and 
women in his culture, cannot surely be regarded as an excuse, but has to be 
taken in consideration as a mitigating factor. (Buckeburg Tribunal 2006) 
This case exemplifies a relativist take on cultural diversity, according to 
which people’s behaviour should be judged on the basis of their own culture. 
This cultural relativist stance invites the criticism, famously advanced by 
Susan Okin, that ‘multiculturalism is bad for women’ (Okin 1999). The 
criticism is that multiculturalism is incompatible with the principles and 
practices of liberal democracy because it fails to take a position against 
illiberal and un-democratic practices; it fails to protect the fundamental rights 
of the vulnerable members of oppressive culture, notably women. A further 
criticism motivated by these cultural relativist sentences is that they are 
based on damaging, if not utterly racist, stereotyping of members of different 
cultures (Benhabib 2004, Phillips 2007). In our example all Sardinians men 
are depicted as violent persons insensitive to the value of gender equality. 
Cultural defence strategies are thus criticisable for offering a degrading image 
of the defendants’ culture. As the president of Sardinia Regional Council 
commented with reference to the Buckeburg Tribunal sentence: “It is 
shocking. There is no Sardinian culture of segregation and violence against 
women. It is only an episode of violence, and as such it should be treated and 
condemned.” The then Italian Under-Secretary of Justice Luigi Manconi 
defined this as an example of ‘differential racism’, and observed how “cultural 
allegiances, ethnic traditions, religious beliefs, eating habits, customs, etc. 
should be recognized and protected, but at an imprescindible condition: that 
fundamental human rights are not violated” (Sardegna Oggi 11 October 
2006).  
These criticisms of tolerating the intolerable and racist stereotyping spring 
from important and understandable ethical and political concerns, but as 
Manconi’s quotation hints at, and several political theorists have stressed in 
the past ten year or so (e.g. Kymlicka 1995, 2007; Benhabib 2002, 2004; 
Phillips 2001, 2007), they should not be taken as condemning 
multiculturalism tout court; they should not invite a backlash against the 
recognition and accommodation of a plurality of cultures within liberal 
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democratic societies. These criticisms can only be made of a cultural relativist 
take on multiculturalism based on an essentialist conception of cultures as 
monolithic wholes constraining their members to behave according to a 
predetermined script, and on a foundationalist view of normative validity 
which links the universal scope of normative claims to their universal 
justificatory ground. The implicit assumption behind the ‘cultural defence’ 
strategy is, in fact, that the perpetrators of ‘criminal’ actions cannot be 
properly regarded as guilty since it is their culture that made them perpetrate 
those actions, and within their culture those actions are not criminalized.  
Another topic of contentious debate within liberal democracies, since at 
least the French ‘scarf affair’ in 1898 when three schoolgirls in France were 
excluded from school for wearing the hijab, is the practice of veiling among 
Muslim women. Most liberal democratic states have had to deal with similar 
challenges, and many of them have passed legislations banning the wearing of 
headscarves in public schools or public institutions in general, Belgium being 
the most recent example.4 Just as the ‘cultural defence’ issue, the ‘veil issue’ 
touches upon crucial questions concerning the limits of liberal democratic 
tolerance. However, this time the normative pendulum swings with a 
fundamentalist touch against the toleration of the expression of cultural 
diversity and in favour of the dogmatic defence of engrained liberal 
democratic principles, such as those of individual liberty and laicity. If the 
cultural relativist approach underlying the cultural defence argument is open 
to the charge of tolerating the intolerable and stereotyping members of 
different cultures, the liberal fundamentalist blanket ban on the use of veils in 
public institutions invites equally poignant charges of intolerance towards the 
tolerable and racist stereotyping. Considering that many Muslim women 
voluntarily decide to wear their veil, as was the case in the French affaire de 
foulard, we can see how, in the name of a rigid reading of state neutrality and 
individual liberty, innocuous expressions of religious and cultural allegiance 
might be curtailed; and how in the name of defending women’s liberty from 
oppressive cultural practices Muslim women can be stereotyped as passive 
victims of Muslim practices. Just as the ‘cultural defence’ argument by 
denying the faculty of autonomous choice of the defendants (mainly men) 
fails to do justice to the victims (mainly women), the ‘forced veil’ argument 
also fails to do justice to women by denying the faculty of making 
autonomous choice of Muslim women (Phillips 2007).  
Similar considerations can be made about the most discussed examples of 
cultural relativism and liberal democratic fundamentalism in the 
international arena, those associated respectively with the ‘Asian values’ 
challenge to the universality of human rights and with the endorsement of a 
                                                 
4 See Benhabib 2004 and Phillips 2007 for a detailed discussion of the scarf affair from a 
deliberative liberal democratic perspective 
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one-size-fits-all approach to liberal democracy by key international 
governmental organizations. The ‘Asian values’ criticism has its origins in the 
outspoken opposition to civil and political rights by Asian leaders at the 1993 
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, when claims of legitimate 
cultural deviations from international human rights norms were raised by 
appealing to the specificity of Asian culture and values. International human 
rights norms were claimed to be the expression of the individualistic ethos of 
the West pitted against the communitarian traditions of Asia (Kausikan 
1993: 38). The Chinese foreign minister maintained that in Asian countries 
“individuals must put the states’ rights before their own”, and the foreign 
minister of Singapore warned “that universal recognition of the ideal of 
human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the 
reality of diversity” (quoted from Sen 1997: 10; see also Sen 2007: 94). 
Although this warning of cultural imperialism and the need for international 
human rights norms to accommodate cultural diversity must be taken 
seriously, in particular in the lights of ideological approaches to the global 
spread of liberal democracy, the problem with the ‘Asian values’ argument is 
that, as Amartya Sen observes, “there are no quintessential values that 
separate the Asians as a group from people in the rest of the world and which 
fit all parts of this immensely large and heterogeneous population” (Sen 1997: 
13). The ‘Asian values’ argument rests on what Sen (2007) calls “the illusion 
of singularity”, the stereotyped and hypostatised view of world civilizations, 
underpinning the Huntingonian thesis of ‘the clash of civilizations’, which 
overlooks “the extent of internal diversities within these civilizational 
categories, and...the reach and influence of interactions that go right across 
the regional borders or so-called civilizations (ibid.: 10). Indeed the ‘Asian 
values’ thesis unquestioningly adopts the same stereotyped view of Western 
culture, as the quintessential depositary of the values of freedom and 
democracy, which was championed by Huntignton. The two theses in fact 
seem to feed off each other (Sen 2007: 93). 
Sen’s argument against the illusion of singularity serves to point out that 
the stereotypisation of cultures is often the expression of political agendas 
that have little to do with issues of cultural identity or with the values of 
cultural and individual autonomy they purport to defend. The view that 
Asian culture is inherently communitarian has come almost exclusively from 
Asian leaders and their advocates who have a vexed interest in maintaining 
the status quo. Similarly, the view that Western culture is quintessentially 
liberal and democratic has typically come from Western elites who have a 
vexed interest in shaping the world political and economic order on their 
terms, as it can be illustrated by the huge benefits roped at the expenses of 
developing countries’ populations by Western corporations from 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank’s structural adjustment 
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programs imposing free market and formal democracy as loan 
conditionalities. Genuine liberal democrats should therefore be adamant that 
“foreign ministers, or government officials, or religious leaders do not have a 
monopoly in interpreting local culture and values. It is important to listen to 
the voices of dissent in each society” (Sen 1997: 43). 
The above considerations show that the oppressive and stereotyping 
outcomes of the cultural relativist and liberal fundamentalist approaches to 
cultural diversity are the result of a same purist reading of culture and 
normative validity. This essentialisit reading also lead them to close spaces for 
public cross-cultural debate, from the local to the global, where different 
cultural allegiances and normative stances can be seriously confronted, 
questioned, re-interpreted, and revised, and where individual autonomy and 
cultural affiliations can be given full respect and mediated. A pragmatist and 
deliberative approach that conceives of the legitimacy of policy-decisions as 
the outcomes of open and inclusive deliberation between all the individuals 
willing to have a say on the decisions affecting their life, and that rejects the 
idea that some interpretation of normative principles and cultural allegiances 
should have some privileged authority over the others, enables liberal 
democratic societies to confront, in the best liberal democratic spirit, the 
never-ending task of tracing a middle path between condemning some 
individuals to live in oppressive minorities or societies and becoming 
themselves oppressive majorities or societies. This is the same point made by 
Seyla Benhabib when she observes how: 
The Scylla of criminalizing and policing [minority] communities and the 
Charybdis of multiculturalist [cultural relativist] tolerance…can be avoided, 
in theory as well as in practice, by modifying our understanding of culture; 
rejecting cultural holism, and by having more faith in the capacity of 
ordinary political actors to renegotiate their own narrative identity and 
difference through multicultural encounters in a democratic civil society 
(Benhabib 2002: 104) 
Indeed, just as a pragmatist conception of culture and normative validity 
enables us to remove the epistemic obstacles to the free questioning of 
received opinions and institutions and to a fair consideration of all points of 
view, as Anne Phillips (2001) has put it, “we always need the maximum 
possible dialogue to counter the false universalisms that have so dogged 
previous practice, as well as the ‘substitutionism’ that has allowed certain 
groups to present themselves as spokespersons for the rest.” 
It is this paper’s contention that the liberal democratic project can be fully 
realized only by abandoning the purist rhetoric of homogeneous and static 
culture and unquestionable normative systems, and opening received 
traditions and institutions to free and inclusive questioning and revision. 
From a pragmatist and deliberative perspective, those who justify exemption 
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from the application of liberal democratic principles by appealing to cultural 
tradition need to show that the particular interpretation of culture appealed 
to is truly representative of all its members. Such an approach allows 
establishing the real intentions behind the appeals to cultural relativism as a 
defence of the principles of cultural autonomy and self-determination. In 
particular, it permits to establish whether what is being defended is really the 
autonomy of a people or rather a repressive system whose practices are only 
the expression of the vested interests of a ruling elite who, as Adamantia 
Pollis (1996; 319) puts it, “exploits the language of cultural relativism to 
justify and rationalise its repressive actions”, or, in Kristen Miller’s words, “in 
rejecting the aspirational character of universalism…merely perpetuates 
traditional practice” (Miller 1996). A pragmatist and deliberative perspective 
can equally help us divesting oppressive policies of their universalistic 
rhetoric, by requiring whoever intends to interfere with the internal affairs of 
other communities to show that their primary motivation is the respect of the 
autonomy of their members.5 Uncovering the ideological and manipulative 
uses of the discourses of universal human rights and democracy, and bringing 
the crucial questions affecting people’s lives, including the interpretation and 
application of human rights and democratic principles, back into the arena of 
inclusive and open confrontation and deliberation within society at large, is 
further vital to win and restore people’s trust in the liberal democratic 
project. For, as Bartolomeo Conti (2002; 182) remarks “it is unlikely that the 
universality of human rights will be able to show its power amongst the third 
world cultures [indeed any culture] as long as they will remain an integral 
part of a strategy of political, economical and cultural control of the West, 
used as an excuse to intervene in and interfere with other countries.” 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
From the pragmatist perspective outlined in the first section it is possible to 
see how cultural relativists and liberal fundamentalists share the same 
shortcomings. They both believe that epistemological solutions are needed in 
order to address political and ethical concerns. This is a belief that is 
reinforced by failing to distinguish between universality as justificatory ground 
for and as scope of application of normative judgments. Cultural relativists, 
                                                 
5 This has significant consequences for the ways in which liberal democratic values and practices 
should be spread globally, setting as a fundamental principle that of giving priority to inclusive 
and self-reflexive discursive means over violent, elitist and ideological ones. This entails as a 
corollary the commitment to do as much as possible to involve and empower the oppressed and 
dissident sectors of those states and communities concerned, and to use force only as a last resort; 
and then only with the ultimate intention to protect civil society, punish exclusively the oppressor, 
and restoring genuine self-determination (Kaldor 2003; 2007) 
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moved by a concern for collective autonomy and cultural sovereignty, are led 
to assert the relative validity of normative claims to cultural standards, as 
they believe that by acknowledging the universal validity of normative claims 
we would end up opening the doors to imperialistic and oppressive attitudes. 
Showing to be still in the grip of the foundationalist view of normative 
validity, they are not satisfied with rejecting the possibility of placing our 
normative claims on universal grounds, but also relativise the scope of 
validity of normative claims to particular cultures. There are as many equally 
valid normative systems as there are cultures. Liberal fundamentalists, 
moved by a concern for individual autonomy and human rights, are led 
instead to assert the universal validity of liberal democratic normative 
claims.6 They conceive of universal validity in terms of justificatory grounds, 
and believe that by rejecting the possibility to place the validity of the value 
of individual autonomy on universal grounds we would open the doors to any 
kind of uncivil and aggressive behaviour. There is a single truth in ethics and 
politics, and this is the liberal democratic one. 
The shared categorical mistake consists in believing that in order to 
protect collective and individual autonomy it is necessary, respectively, to 
reject (cultural relativists) and defend (liberal foundationalists) the 
universalistic aspirations of normative claims. The cultural relativist 
assumption is that one cannot both endorse universalism and be respectful of 
cultural diversity. The liberal foundationalist assumption is that one cannot 
both reject universalism and be respectful of individual human rights. The 
contention of this paper is that it is only by embracing a pragmatist 
conception of normative validity and cultural identity that does away with 
both the cognitive approach to morality and politics common to cultural 
relativists and liberal foundationalists alike, and their shared essentialist 
conception of culture as a homogenous, seamless and static whole, that it will 
be possible to respect and accommodate the values of individual and 
collective autonomy in a fully liberal democratic spirit, showing how it is 
                                                 
6 I am equating here liberal fundamentalism, which represents a first-order normative position, 
with liberal foundationalism which expresses a second-order normative stance towards a particular 
first-order normative position. This does not run counter the distinction between meta-normative 
and normative levels which is at the core of my argument for the political viability of anti-
foundationalism. As I have acknowledged, if foundationalism were to be grammatically viable 
project, it would be possible to conceive of a foundationalist endorsement of self-reflexive and 
omni-inclusive practices of collective deliberation. Yet the claims of normative authority of such 
foundationalist take on liberal democracy would have been so watered down that it would abandon 
any difference with anti-foundationalism that could make a difference in practice. When I refer to 
liberal fundamentalism I should thus be taken to refer also to those foundationalist approaches to 
liberal democracy that place particular interpretation and implementation of its key values and 
principles above collective debate and possible revision. In the rest of the paper I may sometimes 
use the terms interchangeably depending on whether I am emphasising the meta-normative or 
normative aspect of liberal foundationalism. 
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possible to be universalists and respect cultural diversity, and be anti-
foundationalists but respectful of individual rights 
A pragmatist approach to normativity, while affirming the ‘man-made’ 
character of normative claims acknowledges their universalistic aspiration, 
therefore preserving the normative force of our critical faculties and rebuking 
the traditional charges of radical relativism raised against anti-
foundationalist positions. In particular, while asserting the contingent nature 
of liberal democratic values and institutions, it preserves their universal scope 
of application. The recognition of the scope-universalistic dimension of 
normative claims is not however taken to entail any lack of respect for 
cultural diversity and autonomy. To the contrary, the recognition of the 
ground-relativity of normative claims, namely the impossibility to place a 
particular set of principles, and their interpretation and application, on 
absolute foundations, allows liberal democratic pragmatists to accommodate 
cultural diversity at home and abroad by opening particular historical 
interpretations and implementations of the requirements of individual 
autonomy and democracy to re-signification and revision. Similarly, while 
disputing static and monolithic conceptions of cultural tradition, a 
pragmatist approach to culture is capable to acknowledge the importance of 
cultural allegiances and sovereignty for people’s lives. However, this 
recognition of the importance of cultural belonging and autonomy does not 
work as a conversation-stopper to protect particular interpretations of 
particular cultures from internal or external criticism. To the contrary, the 
recognition of the disputed and disputable character of the defining features 
of a culture allows multicultural pragmatists to accommodate the value of 
individual autonomy by opening public spaces for internal and external 
normative dissent against received interpretations of cultural identity, in this 
way also guaranteeing a safety exit for the protection of individual liberties.  
Even though a pragmatist approach to normative validity and cultural 
identity enables us to overcome the meta-normative shortcoming underlying 
the political concerns of cultural relativists and liberal democratic 
fundamentalists, it does not offer us protection against the actual political 
threats underlying those concerns. The final responsibility for designing and 
implementing institutions and policies capable to foster and protect both 
individual and cultural autonomy is ultimately on us, on our substantial 
normative visions and our concrete political and ethical commitment to them. 
However a pragmatist approach to human agency, by bringing to the fore the 
volitional nature of normative conflict, enables us to face our responsibility for 
the creation and maintenance of a liberal democratic culture, and to focus our 
energies on the only means by which we could ever bring about political and 
social change, i.e. political will and concrete reformist commitment. Yet 
again, however, such a pragmatist view is not linked to any substantial 
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normative position. It is only a meta-normative conception of the basis of 
normative obligations and cultural allegiance. 
The contention of this paper is that by combining a pragmatist and 
deliberative approach to liberal democracy we are able to move beyond the 
debate between cultural relativism and liberal fundamentalism that has 
paralysed liberal democrats with the fear of giving in either to the intolerable 
or to intolerance. The double fear of endorsing either a too lax interpretation 
of liberal democratic principles that allows too much room for intolerant 
communities or a too rigid interpretation of the terms and conditions of 
liberal democracy that allows too little room for cultural diversity. A 
pragmatist and deliberative perspective enables us to appreciate that there is 
an alternative to this either/or of laxism and rigidity, that the respect of 
cultural attachments does not have to conflict with the respect of individual 
freedoms. The alternative is that of opening the debate over the social 
practices and principles we should follow to the free and inclusive deliberation 
of all the affected and interested actors, including the discussion and revision 
of the practical solutions of how to accommodate cultural and individual 
autonomy. It is possible to walk this middle path between cultural relativism 
and liberal foundationalism by eliminating the epistemic and ontological 
obstacles to the discussion and revision of received interpretations of human 
rights and cultural values and paving the way for a deliberative liberal 
democratic multiculturalism. 
A pragmatist and deliberative approach to liberal democracy thus 
empowers people by placing the interpretation and implementation of human 
rights standards and democratic principles into the hands of all human 
beings, rather than the disenfranchising hands of God, Nature, Reason, 
Culture or, in fact, the ruling class of the day which hides behind them. This 
reliance on liberal and democratic public spheres will surely not extinguish 
cultural, social and political conflicts, yet I believe it constitutes our best hope 
for civilizing them, for replacing deaf and violent confrontation with peaceful 
and fruitful conversation across differences. Our best hope for preventing the 
possible common ground for cross-cultural debate and cosmopolitan 
citizenship from being eroded by those who think to gain from stereotyping 
cultural difference and radicalising cultural conflicts. Indeed, fostering and 
protecting public spaces for considered and self-reflexive conversation across 
diversity and cultures may be our best hope for keeping the Enlightenment’s 
project of human rights and democratic emancipation alive, even after having 
dropped the foundationalist expectations of Enlightenment’s rationalism.7  
 
 
                                                 
7 See Rorty (1997) for an ‘enlightening’ discussion of the reciprocal independence of the two 
Enlightenment’s projects of rationalism and liberal democracy.  
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